

**The 8th US Army: A Case for Warfighting**

**A Monograph  
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## **ABSTRACT**

**Title: *The 8th US Army: A Case for Warfighting* by Major Hershel L. Holiday, USA, 54 pages.**

On 10 January 1998, 8th Army became an Army Service Component Command (ASCC), an organization with multiple capabilities and increased flexibility. An ASCC is both a unit and a function designed to render operational support to army units as well as Title 10 logistics support to other services within the theater of operations. This move represents a general trend among theater armies, and more specifically, numbered armies, to reorganize and assume greater operational warfighting duties with fewer logistic and support responsibilities.

This monograph answers the research question: Based on history, doctrine, and theory, can 8th Army execute the missions and increased duties of an ASCC? A secondary question is whether or not such a change is necessary or more effective. This monograph addresses these issues through the constructs of history, theory, and doctrine and concludes with a comparison of 8th Army with two of its counterpart organizations- US Army Europe (USAREUR) and 3d Army.

Eighth Army has a unique and honorable history. During World War II, 8th Army fought as a field army; between wars, it was an occupation force in Japan; during the Korean War, 8th Army fought as both a field and theater army; and, throughout the Cold War, it remained primarily a theater army with operational logistic missions.

Doctrine, from theater army to operational logistics, has evolved to allow area Commanders-in-Chief (CINC) tremendous flexibility in designing their ASCCs. These changes give greater power to the area CINC to configure the ASCC to meet the unique needs of a specific geographical area. These changes also allow the CINC to assign operational support as well as warfighting duties to the ASCC. These increased capabilities allow 8th Army to assume greater warfighting duties.

The challenge for 8th Army is to decide if its structure can support the execution of these tasks to standard. One method of measuring 8th Army's capabilities is to compare it with a US Army Corps. Comparing 8th Army with other ASCCs highlights its unique existence within a sub-unified command on the Korean Peninsula.

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## INTRODUCTION

On 25 June 1950, nine divisions and 135,000 troops of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) crossed the 38th parallel in a general invasion of South Korea. When the resistance of the 100,000 troops of the Army of the Republic of Korea (ROK) proved of no avail, South Korean President Syngman Rhee's government in Seoul abandoned its capital and joined the retreat south. North Korea's aggression challenged the United Nations' (UN) peacekeeping mission along with the United States (US) policy of "containment" of communist expansion in Europe and Asia.<sup>1</sup>

Shocked by the North Korean attack, the US government encouraged the UN to mobilize an effective political response. During the week following the invasion, deliberations in the UN and Washington moved the world toward war. UN resolutions committed the organization to stop North Korean aggression. By the end of the week, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the US Far East Command, reported little hope in saving Korea unless the US entered the fight. On 30 June 1950, MacArthur recommended the commitment of combat elements of the Eighth US Army (8th US Army), located in Japan.<sup>†</sup> Without hesitation, US President Harry S. Truman approved the plan and the 8th Army began what became a permanent presence on the Korean Peninsula.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>†</sup> Throughout this monograph the author will refer to the Eighth US Army as either "Eighth US Army" or "8th US Army." Both doctrine writers and historians use these three titles interchangeably, however, for clarity, the author will use only the numerical reference or the written number in accordance with the rules of grammar.

Since the Korean War, 8th Army's structure has changed several times. Eighth Army began as a warfighting headquarters during the Korean War, providing command and control (C2) for a US Army Corps, Marines, Air Force, and a host of allied nations under the British Commonwealth Division. These nations were Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Turkey, Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, and Luxembourg. The "shooting war" ended along the 38th Parallel, known today as the Demarcation Zone (DMZ). Throughout both World War II and the Korean War, 8th Army was primarily a field army responsible for the command and control of multiple corps and divisions. Since then, 8th Army has been primarily a theater army responsible for logistic support, infrastructure, and for bringing new forces into the Korean area of responsibility (AOR) when or if fighting resumed. Throughout its existence, 8th Army has been a field army, a theater army, and, in some ways, a numbered army. Perhaps one of the most complicated portions of US military history is the concept of theater, group, field, and numbered armies. Eighth Army also exists in a unique environment as a component command that works for a sub-unified commander.

Eighth Army has always been a unique organization, when compared to other theater armies that work directly for a combatant commander. There are three land-oriented geographical combatant commands: US European Command (EUCOM), US Central Command (CENTCOM), and US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Maritime theaters are designed as forward defense forces that offer strategic access to US resource needs, friends, and potential

adversaries. Atlantic Command (ACOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM) are the nation's only two maritime theaters.<sup>3</sup> The CINC in Korea is also known as the commander of US Forces Korea (USFK), UN Command (UNC), and Combined Forces Command (CFC). Though 8th Army lies within the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR), the CINC in Korea and the 8th Army commander do not work directly for the PACOM commander. However, there exists a unique relationship between these organizations.

The most recent change to the 8th Army is its transformation from a theater army to an army service component command (ASCC). An ASCC is both a unit and a function designed to render operational support along with Title 10 logistic support to all army units.<sup>4</sup> Eighth Army's transition creates both challenges and increased capabilities. This move represents a general trend among numbered armies to reorganize and assume greater operational warfighting duties and fewer logistics and support responsibilities. This monograph answers the research question: "Based on history, doctrine, and theory, can 8th Army execute the missions and increased duties of an ASCC?" A secondary question is whether or not such a change is necessary or more effective. This monograph addresses these issues through the constructs of history, theory, and doctrine and concludes with a comparison of 8th Army with two of its counterpart organizations -US Army Europe (USAREUR) and 3d Army.

The first chapter provides a brief doctrine review of key terms and organizations essential to understanding the ASCC's development. The ASCC evolved from a series of structural developments at echelons above corps

(EAC). For example, chapter 1 shows that the theater army has always possessed warfighting tasks; however, after 1974, these tasks became primarily theater support with limited warfighting tasks. Chapter 1 also provides a clear understanding of various C2 levels used throughout the monograph and defines the terms *theater*, *field*, and *numbered armies* and the *army group* organization.

Chapter 2 reviews 8th Army's unique history since the Korean War to show 8th Army's development from a fighting unit to an operational logistics unit, to its current organization. Chapter 2 also reviews the history of the unified command plan to show the emergence of the theater army system and its capabilities. The monograph analyzes 8th Army's history in phases from World War II (WWII) through the Cold War to its transition to an ASCC.

Chapter 3 uses the definitions from chapter 1 to explore and analyze the history of support and operational doctrine as they relate to the ASCC. The 8th Army, as an ASCC, is a combination of the previous theater, field, and numbered armies. Chapter 3 reviews US Army Field Manuals (FM) 100-5 *Operations*; 100-10, *Support of Echelons Above Corps*; 100-16, *Support*; 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*; and other doctrine manuals to establish the ASCC's primary duties and capabilities. This doctrine review establishes the criteria with which to measure the value of the ASCC. Chapter 3 also provides the framework to evaluate and compare 8th Army with other ASCCs.

Chapter 4 evaluates 8th Army based on the criteria or doctrine responsibilities identified in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 compares 8th Army with the warfighting capabilities and structure of a US corps. As an ASCC, 8th Army



must be capable of operational planning using corps and division maneuver units. The corps structure provides the best example of how the EAC staff should fight. This chapter also suggests the table of organization and equipment (TOE) (or staff manning and equipment requirements) that allows 8th Army to succeed as a warfighting ASCC.<sup>5</sup>

Chapter 5 compares 8th Army's mission as an ASCC with those of the only other forward-deployed theater army/ASCC, USAREUR, and the only Continental United States (CONUS)-based theater army/ASCC, 3d Army.<sup>6</sup> Each theater army or ASCC is unique with a structure based on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops available, and time (METT-T). For example, V Corps, in Europe, relieves USAREUR of the responsibility of establishing a warfighting capability in addition to its support responsibilities; however 8th Army has no US corps immediately available on the Korean Peninsula. These differences illustrate 8th Army's unique designation as an ASCC, as compared with other theater army units.

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **THEATER, FIELD, AND NUMBERED ARMIES**

The US Army's organizational structure has changed or evolved from a large, wartime army to a peacetime force involved primarily in stability and support operations. Before analyzing the history and current doctrine of ASCCs, it is necessary to understand and distinguish between theater, field, and numbered army structures.

According to a pre-World War II version of FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations Operations*, the theater army resembled the current combatant command.<sup>7</sup> This 1941 version says “a theater commander may be designated by the President or by the War Department.”<sup>8</sup> It further states that theater missions were general in character and left great discretion to the commander. This manual also introduced the *army group* as a structure consisting of two or more armies. The group commander was directly subordinate to the theater commander and responsible for the tactical operations of field armies.<sup>9</sup> The group concept was rarely mentioned in subsequent manuals and disappeared completely after the Korean War. Lacking in this manual was a detailed description of the field army.

After World War II, the theater army commander continued to function like today’s geographical CINC. The 1950 FM 100-15, *Field Service Regulations for Larger Units*, says that the theater commander was largely a supervisor, a planner, and a coordinator who decentralized combat and administrative operations to his army groups and communication zone commanders.<sup>10</sup> This concept would prevail long after the Korean War through the mid-1970s. This manual, along with the 1949 version of FM 100-5, introduced the *field army* concept.<sup>11</sup> (See Figure 1.)





Figure 1. Theater army organization (large theater of operations). World War II and the Korean War. From approximately 1941 through 1974.

The first post-WWII version of FM 100-5 describes the field army as a level of command composed of a variable number of corps and divisions. Subsequent manuals provide detailed diagrams and tasks for the field army organization. However, the 1974 version of FM 100-15 *Larger Unit Operations* (Test) eliminated the field army concept as a “self-contained” combat force.<sup>12</sup> Numbered armies would activate, when necessary, as a command level to coordinate the operations of multiple corps and divisions. The corps would eventually become a standard tactical combat force.

The 1963 version of FM 100-15 continues to describe the theater army as capable of performing “strategic, tactical, and administrative operations.”<sup>13</sup> Its organization maintained field armies and groups. At some point between the 1963 and 1974 versions of FM 100-15 Test, this robust theater army concept

disappeared. Toward the end of the Vietnam War, the theater army became the army component command for the unified or sub-unified commander in a theater of operations.<sup>14</sup> This 1974 manual states that “in time of war, the theater army commander exercised command of all US Army forces, less operational control of the corps and other Army elements that may be held under the control of the unified commander.”<sup>15</sup> The numbered army concept also contributed to the challenges of understanding these previous command relationships.

The 1974 version of FM 100-15 (Test) was also the first doctrine manual to mention the numbered army as a possible necessity in large-scale operations. Since eliminating the field army, the next level of command was the combatant commander, who did not have the staff and resources to fight multiple corps. Therefore, the 1974 version of FM 100-15 said that a numbered army would control multiple corps in time of war.<sup>16</sup> The 1986 edition of FM 100-5 reinforces this concept, which 3d Army followed during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (1990-1991).<sup>17</sup> However, the 1993 version of 100-5 does not address this concept; instead, it introduces the ASCC.<sup>18</sup> (See Figure 2)



*Figure 2. Theater army organization (large theater of operations). World War II and the Korean War. From approximately 1974 through post Cold War.*

In summary, theater armies once commanded field armies and field armies commanded corps. Numbered armies replaced field armies as an interim command between corps and theater commands. The warfighting duties of the theater and field/numbered armies have either disappeared or shifted to the ASCC. This monograph analyzes 8th Army's capacity to perform these missions. A historical analysis of 8th Army's development from inception through its ASCC transition begins this analysis.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **8TH US ARMY HISTORY: FROM FIELD TO THEATER ARMY TO ASCC**

Eighth Army has a unique and honorable history. It began as a field army, became an occupation force, then a theater army. During World War II, 8th Army fought as a field army; during the Korean War, it fought as both a field and theater army; finally, throughout the Cold War, it remained primarily a theater army with operational logistic missions. As the only ASCC under a sub-unified command, 8th Army is much different from other theater armies. The history of 8th Army explains its evolutionary transition.

Eighth Army was activated at Memphis, Tennessee, on 10 June 1944, and departed for the Pacific where it earned the reputation and nickname "Amphibious Eighth." The unit completed more than sixty "island hopping campaign" assaults. Eighth Army helped liberate the Philippines and, on 1 July 1945, assumed control of its first land-oriented AOR, ending Japanese resistance in the Philippine Islands. After V-J Day, 8th Army, with 6th Army, provided ground forces for General Douglas MacArthur's occupation of Japan. These armies landed peacefully on 30 August 1945. Eighth Army initially occupied the Northern portion of Japan. With the relief of 6th Army from occupation duties, beginning 1 January 1946, 8th Army assumed complete responsibility for all Japanese islands.<sup>19</sup>

Eighth Army's occupational duties included disarming Japanese military forces; destroying the nation's war-making capability; conducting war crimes trials; guiding the defeated nation into peaceful pursuits and a democratic way of

life; encouraging economic rehabilitation, local autonomy, education and land reform; guarding installations; protecting supply routes; and watching over government operations.<sup>20</sup>

After the challenges of the Pacific Campaign and Japanese occupation, 8th Army's duties expanded to a quasi theater/field army organization on the Korean Peninsula. To halt communist expansion, throughout the Far East, the Korean Peninsula was split along the 38th Parallel between the opposing forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. On 25 June 1950, this Cold War standoff ended when North Korean troops, using Soviet-made tanks and equipment, invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK). The UN demanded a halt to the aggression and asked its members to support aid to South Korea. Truman responded by directing MacArthur to furnish assistance. The US Navy, Air Force, and logistic assistance to South Korea were not strong enough to halt the North Korean attack. It was evident that ground forces from other nations would have to assist in preventing total conquest of South Korea.<sup>21</sup>

Eighth Army was still in Japan when it received the mission to halt North Korean aggression and reestablish the demarcation line. Assuming the role of both field and theater armies, 8th Army managed theater logistics while commanding and controlling both the 1st US Corps (I Corps) and 9th US Corps (IX Corps). Lead elements entered Korea on 30 June 1950. The first unit to engage North Korean forces was Task Force (TF) *Smith* which was part of the 24th Infantry Division (24ID). The North Koreans quickly defeated this force of relatively inexperienced soldiers as they attempted a delaying action north of

Osan on 5 July. On 6 July 1950, the 25th ID moved to Pusan, and an 8th Army advanced headquarters moved to Taegu on 7 July; it became operational on the peninsula on 13 July.<sup>22</sup>

Eighth Army continued its delay south into the southeast corner of Korea, into what became known as the "Pusan Perimeter." Eighth Army commander, General Walton Walker, declared that Pusan would be no Dunkirk: "The Eighth Army would stay in Korea until the invader was expelled from the territory of the Republic of Korea."<sup>23</sup> During this period, 8th Army fought against relentless North Korean attacks, but held.

On 15 September 1950, the 10th US Corps (X Corps), formed in Japan, then conducted an amphibious assault landing at Inchon in what is considered one of the most brilliant maneuvers in military history. The next day, 8th Army launched a general counterattack north in coordination with the Inchon landing. The North Koreans resisted savagely for five days, while the UN Command (UNC) air forces pounded North Korean supply and communications lines. North Korean defenses crumbled, and 8th Army achieved a breakout, which began a rapid advance north. Fighting inland from Inchon to Seoul, X Corps inadvertently blocked the invader's line of retreat north. The North Korean withdrawal became a rout; only disorganized remnants were able to reach North Korea.<sup>24</sup> In addition to its warfighting success, 8th Army assumed tremendous logistic responsibilities.

The organization for logistic support in Korea was less than optimal, which is not surprising given the short notice and accelerated tempo for starting the



operation. The actual theater Army was Far East Command in Japan, under MacArthur's command. MacArthur's staff was still an occupation army staff and not yet prepared to fight a war. Therefore, 8th Army's rear headquarters provided both logistic support for the Army in Korea and area administration in Japan for the first two months of the war. On 25 August 1950, 8th Army's rear support echelon became the Japan Logistical Command (JLC), and was, in effect, a theater communications zone (COMMZ) organization. Eighth Army in Korea submitted its requisitions to the JLC, which in turn, requisitioned supplies from the United States.<sup>25</sup> At this point, 8th Army functioned as a theater army, controlling operational logistics and support, while simultaneously functioning as a field army, maneuvering corps and divisions.

Further evidence shows that 8th Army was also responsible for many tasks which, in World War II, had belonged to theater armies within communications zones. Eighth Army's logistic missions included support for all UN forces within the Far East Command with few exceptions. Eighth Army did not provide ammunition and technical services for Air Force or Marine Corps-specific equipment. Immediately following the Inchon landing, X Corps fought as a separate corps under MacArthur's direct control; however 8th Army delivered X Corps' logistic requirements. Tenth Corps submitted requisitions directly to the JLC, however; it received supplies via Pusan for processing by 8th Army.<sup>26</sup> Eighth Army received and stored supplies and materiel on the Korean Peninsula and was also responsible for moving these resources forward. Such logistic

operations would have occurred behind the army's rear boundaries in World War II.<sup>27</sup>

The 8th Army continued to drive north against demoralized resistance. On 9 October 1950, the 1st Cavalry Division followed the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) forces north across the 38th Parallel into North Korea. On 19 October, the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang fell. Korean forces reached the Yalu River on 28 October. On 24 November, after a brief pause to improve logistic shortages and to reorganize personnel, the UNC began a drive to extend control over all North Korea. During this same month, communist Chinese "volunteers" attacked across the Yalu in what MacArthur termed "a brand new war."<sup>28</sup> Facing well-equipped and well-disciplined Chinese forces, 8th Army and X Corps withdrew south of the 38th Parallel.

After a jeep accident that killed General Walton Walker, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway assumed command of UNC ground forces. Ridgway requested that X Corps join 8th Army in order to improve C2 throughout the Peninsula.<sup>29</sup> Under Ridgway's leadership, UN forces stalled the Chinese attack along the 38th Parallel. By the end of May 1951, the battle lines were again roughly the same as along the former DMZ.<sup>30</sup>

On 11 April 1951, Ridgway replaced MacArthur as CINC UNC and Supreme Commander US Army Pacific and CINC, Far East. Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet assumed command of 8th Army. Shortly there after, armistice negotiations began that launched a series of inconclusive battles

designed to increase bargaining power during the two-year negotiation process.<sup>31</sup>

During the next two years of stalemate 8th Army maintained readiness for a possible renewal of open hostilities. During this period, the communists had no real hope of military victory and no genuine desire for peace. Therefore, they used propaganda raising irrelevant demands in an information war designed to bring a political victory.<sup>32</sup>

The theater support structure underwent a number of evolutionary changes from January 1951 until the end of 1952. In September 1951, 8th Army formed an army base area immediately behind the army service area. This act divided the area into the combat zone and the base area, thus allowing 8th Army to focus more effort on warfighting activities.

In August of 1952, General Mark W. Clark established the Korean communications zone (KCOMZ) to relieve 8th Army of responsibility for logistic and territorial operations not immediately related to combat operations. In this way, Clark attempted to reorganize 8th Army into more of a field army than a theater army. Finally, on 1 January 1953, the Far East Command became a joint headquarters with three major subordinate commands: US Army Forces, Far East; Naval Forces, Far East; and the Far East Air Forces. Eighth Army, KCOMZ Headquarters, Service (which provided services and supplies in the Tokyo area), and Ryukyus commands all came under US Army Forces, Far East.

The Army was the executive agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the Far East, making US Army Forces, Far East, the executive agent for logistics and administration. US Army Forces were responsible for providing support to US, South Korean, and other UN forces, nonmilitary agencies, and activities.

The Army was also responsible for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), which supplied common items for Naval and Air Forces, Far East, and local procurement for Japanese security forces. It also provided equipment repair, petroleum supply, real estate and port management, health policy, and graves registration services. All of these missions and responsibilities could fall within the scope of the ASCC in a theater of operations.<sup>33</sup>

On 11 February 1953, Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor became 8th Army commander. Newly elected US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had pledged to end the Korean War, renewed the call for an armistice. Though South Korean President Syngman Rhee favored a military victory, the UNC prevailed and both sides signed the Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953. Eighth Army then began stability and support operations to assist the Korean people as well as help ROK forces build provisions for self-defense. Eighth Army also continued to be an international unit, closely aligned with ROKA and other allied forces and remained the ground force arm responsible for carrying out UNC armistice responsibilities; it also supervised the training of ROKA forces, and administered aid and relief.<sup>34</sup>

On 20 November 1954, Far-East Command and 8th Army combined to form what became a theater army under a sub-unified commander. This new organization received the title of Eighth Army Headquarters and became the Army component command in the Far East. The combined headquarters moved from Camp Zama, Japan, to Seoul on 26 July 1955. Camp Zama Headquarters was re-designated Headquarters, Armed Forces Far East/Eighth Army (Rear). Two years later during the overall reorganization of Pacific Armed Forces, Far East Command and Armed Forces, Far East were deactivated. Headquarters, UNC, moved from Tokyo to Seoul, where 8th Army Headquarters remains.<sup>35</sup>

In 1970, the National Command Authorities (NCA) decided to reduce US forces in Korea to allow ROKA forces to assume the primary burden of ground defense against North Korea. As a result, 8th Army personnel strength was reduced to 18,000 by the end of June 1971.<sup>36</sup>

Beginning in the mid-1970s, 8th Army's role changed again. In November 1978, the ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC) was activated to take over UNC's responsibility for planning and, if necessary, directing the defense of Korea. US President Jimmy Carter pledged to remove all US combat forces from Korea by 1981; however, this goal met political resistance from those who felt that Korean security was pivotal to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia. US troop numbers leveled off at slightly less than 36,000.<sup>37</sup>

This chapter illustrates 8th Army's evolution from a field army with specified warfighting and maneuver units and tasks, through an occupation period, then to a quasi-field/theater army, and finally a theater army with only

minor warfighting duties. On 10 January 1998, 8th Army was designated as an ASCC, an organization with multiple capabilities and increased flexibility.

Chapter 3 analyzes the doctrinal foundation of the ASCC.

## CHAPTER 3

### EVOLUTION OF ASCC DOCTRINE

*Providing full-spectrum dominance requires command and control.... In the past, [8th Army] was primarily concerned about management functions and force-provision functions like logistics.... The change has now shifted the focus to that of command and control.*

Colonel Mark Gerner, 8th Army Chief of Force  
Development<sup>38</sup>

Doctrine, from theater army to operational logistics, has evolved to allow area CINCs tremendous flexibility in designing their ASCC.<sup>39</sup> The ASCC's doctrinal structure, functions, and capabilities derived from the theater army support concept. Though doctrine changes and updates are common for an army in transition, these changes surrendered greater power to the area CINC to configure the ASCC to meet the needs of the AOR. This allowed the CINC to assign operational support as well as warfighting duties to the ASCC. Most of this doctrine is consistent, yet each ASCC is unique to its AOR.

Some of the most significant changes in the Army came during the post-Vietnam/Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. As previously stated, the most significant change in ASCC doctrine came with the 1974 version of FM

100-15 (Test), which significantly reduced the warfighting capabilities of the theater army.<sup>40</sup> The doctrine removed field armies from the theater army structure. The most recent doctrinal information on the ASCC comes from FMs 100-5, 100-10, 100-16, and 100-7. A review of these manuals over time provides a historical perspective of ASCC doctrine.

The component command concept has always been part of army doctrine. Changes occurred primarily because of changes in the size of the US military and its command structure. Shifts in US strategy have also contributed to changes in component command doctrine. Research shows that both warfighting and logistic manuals have contributed to developing the ASCC. Chapter 3 reviews the evolution of post-1974 ASCC doctrine from the theater and numbered army concepts through today's ASCC.

The 1976 version of FM 100-5 states that in a large theater of operations involving more than one corps, the theater army headquarters provides overall management of logistic operations.<sup>41</sup> This description of the theater army is consistent with 8th Army's transition from war to peacetime or garrison operations. Theater army tasks included assigning logistic missions and allocating resources. The manual also allowed the theater army to establish a theater army area command (TAACOM) behind the corps rear boundaries to manage materiel as it passed through the logistic system. The TAACOM also supported units located in the rear area that included air defense, military police, and the theater reserve.<sup>42</sup> Therefore, early operational doctrine separated logistic and warfighting tasks between two command structures: a theater army

for logistic support functions, and field or numbered armies to command and control corps-level units.<sup>43</sup> The ASCC concept potentially removes the field and numbered armies and leaves one unit structure to handle both of these complex tasks.

FM 100-10 (1976) provides a brief outline and discussion of the evolution of theater armies, including numbered armies and component commands.<sup>44</sup> This manual states that numbered armies were an exception, but necessary in wartime. In a large theater of operations, where the land force structure reached a magnitude that required an intermediate control unit, the numbered army commander would provide an intermediate headquarters between the theater commander and the corps.<sup>45</sup> However, in small theaters, the largest land force might be a single corps. In this case, the corps would likely perform the ASCC function.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, 100-10 states that the numbered army normally does not operate combat service support (CSS) installations. It does, however, establish priorities for supplies, movements, and allocation of replacements to major subordinate commands. When used, the numbered army directs the strategic and tactical operations of multiple corps and functions under the command of the theater army commander.<sup>47</sup>

Among other tasks listed in FM 100-10, the numbered army commander estimates overall CSS, troop, and supply requirements to support operations, and makes recommendations to the theater army commander for the allocation of appropriate resources.<sup>48</sup> The commander also assigns territorial responsibilities to subordinate corps.<sup>49</sup> The challenge with this directive is that



the numbered army seems to be only a temporary duty or wartime requirement. In peacetime, these requirements and capabilities must reside with either the combatant commander or the ASCC. Since the combatant commander has a joint mission, with-wide ranging interests, the ASCC is perhaps the best organization to receive this mission.

The 1982 edition of FM 100-5 was the first to address the service component commander as a separate component. It states that the area CINC exercises operational command authority through service component commanders.<sup>50</sup> It further states that the service component commander is responsible for recommending the proper employment of his forces and for accomplishing operational tasks assigned by the joint commander. He is also responsible to his service in matters of:

- Internal administration and discipline.
- Training in [own] service doctrine, techniques, and tactics.
- Designation of specific units to meet joint requirements
- Logistics functions normal to the component forces.
- Service intelligence matters.<sup>51</sup>

This version of 100-5 does not designate what types of units would conduct these functions. It simply refers to the function and indicates that “a commander” would execute. Also listed in this manual is the concept of operational support tasks as opposed to warfighting tasks. Similar to the 1976 version, the 1986 version suggests that numbered armies would execute warfighting tasks and the component commands would handle logistics.

The 1986 FM 100-5 states that the theater army is normally the army service component in a unified command.<sup>52</sup> It lists the 3d and 8th US Armies

along with USAREUR as examples of theater armies designated as army service components. And, unlike its predecessor, the 1986 version states that the army service component has both operations and support responsibilities and that the theater CINC is responsible for assigning these tasks. These tasks could have been exclusively operational missions, logistic tasks, or a combination of both.<sup>53</sup> It further states that theater army commanders are responsible to the unified commander in a theater for recommending the employment and allocation of forces. Support duties include organizing, equipping, training, and maintaining army forces in the theater.<sup>54</sup> This manual was the first to suggest that the geographical CINC could determine ASCC missions.

The 1986 version also states that the organization of theater armies is not standard throughout the US Army. The structure of the theater army or service component depends on the size of the army component and METT-T factors. It is also the first to suggest that *other* levels of command could perform theater army functions pending the size and number of US Army corps committed to an area of operations (AO). For example, if a single corps were committed to a contingency area, that corps would likely sustain itself without significant augmentation. However, in larger operations, an enlarged separate staff might augment where necessary to facilitate administrative, legal, logistic, personnel, intelligence, operational, and communications tasks.<sup>55</sup>

The 1993 and 2000 (draft) versions of 100-5 add little to the development of the ASCC. These deal with the complex issues involved in transitioning the Army from a Cold War/Soviet Union focus to peace operations and limited

engagements throughout the world. However, FM 100-10 (1995), 100-16 (1995), and 100-7 (1995) continue to develop the ASCC for the twenty-first Century.

The 1995 version of FM 100-10 represents current doctrine.<sup>56</sup> It states that the ASCC commander is the senior Army operational-level commander assigned to a unified command.<sup>57</sup> He is the principal advisor to the CINC for supporting and employing Army forces within, and support structures outside of, the AOR. The ASCC performs the following functions:

- Establishes links among Army, joint, multinational, and interagency or UN elements.
- Performs Title 10, US Code, support through administrative (or service) channels, or delegates to an intermediate headquarters.
- Plans and executes operations in support of the joint campaign.<sup>58</sup>

FM 100-10 allows the ASCC to designate or establish a support command and control headquarters in the COMMZ, which handles most of the support or logistic tasks. It further states that this headquarters orchestrates the CSS effort for the ASCC.<sup>59</sup> Under this concept the area support group (ASG) provides the following:

- Subordinate C2 element for the EAC support headquarters.
- Area responsibility for supply to include petroleum support.
- Field service support (including water purification and mortuary affairs.
- Maintenance.
- Real property management (depending on the AO).
- Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warning and reporting.
- Rear operations in its assigned area.<sup>60</sup>

At this point, doctrine supports the concept of a subordinate CSS function designed to provide the traditional theater support requirements. This capability allows some ASCCs to focus more on war planning than on support functions.

FM 100-16 (1995) is current doctrine and provides a clear description of the theater army as an ASCC. It states that the "army's theater organization provides the means for executing the designs of operational art while facilitating joint operations."<sup>61</sup> The ASCC commander was formally known as the theater army commander.<sup>62</sup> The ASCC's duties include preparing, training, equipping, administering, and providing CSS to army forces assigned to unified or specified commands. He also supports the theater combatant CINC by conducting army operations in support of operational and strategic objectives. In addition, the ASCC can be involved at varying degrees in each one of the following missions:

- Establishing the link between joint, combined, and interagency non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), or UN operations.
- Planning and executing operations in support of the joint campaign.
- Executing support operations to sustain subordinate army forces.<sup>63</sup>

The ASCC also plans and coordinates the expansion and operation of wartime lines of communication; the reception, preparation, and transportation of US Army Augmentation forces; the provision of operational-level intelligence support; tactical and chemical support to allies; and the development, acquisition, operation, and maintenance of operational and support facilities.<sup>64</sup>

FM 100-16 further states that the ASCC is responsible to the unified commander for accomplishing inherent peacetime missions and functions, including planning and preparing for war.<sup>65</sup> The ASCC also communicates

directly with the Department of Defense on uniservice matters related to administration, personnel, training, CSS, communications, doctrine, combat developments, and intelligence. The ASCC coordinates with component commanders from the US Air Force and Navy, the subordinate commanders within unified and multinational commands, and NGOs/PVOs and interagencies, as required.<sup>66</sup>

There are some situations where the ASCC will not control the assets in theater. A joint forces commander (JFC) in theater operations might establish an alternate C2 arrangement. Command arrangements, statutory requirements, and other considerations also affect command relationships. Specific examples include the area air defense organization and the US Army Intelligence and Security Commands (USAINSCOM), which are under the operational control (OPCON) of the ASCC depending on the situation. All other offensive counterintelligence operations are in general support (GS) to the theater. Theater logistic operations are OPCON to the ASCC in wartime, and US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) units are under the control of their parent unit. In wartime, the USACE district or mobilization contingent might be placed OPCON to the ASCC or the CINC.<sup>67</sup>

While the tactical commander focuses on his tactical mission, the operational-level commander, or ASCC, must focus and concentrate resources in the following areas: joint, multinational, and interagency linkages; and conduct of army operations. Therefore either the CINC or the ASCC must decide which missions the army service component will execute. According to FM 100-16,

there are normally three options.<sup>68</sup> The area CINC determines the first two options, while the third is internal to the ASCC. First, the ASCC could act as an operational-level C2 headquarters. Second, the ASCC could deploy as an operational headquarters, for example a numbered army, to control the conduct of operations when there are two or more corps. The ASCC makes these decisions in consultation with the CINC. The third option requires several internal changes.

The third option is internal to the ASCC and concerns the organization of the operational-level component. The ASCC might determine a need to consolidate functions under a deputy commanding general (DCG) responsible for operations and a DCG responsible for support and CSS. The DCG for support would serve as the senior logistician responsible for battle command of all CSS and support forces and for coordinating logistic support for joint and/or multinational forces in the theater of operations. The DCG for operations serves as the senior operator responsible for battle command of all maneuver forces. He also conducts major operations, battles, and engagements. In this arrangement, the ASCC continues service responsibilities and establishes required linkages among joint, multinational, interagency, NGO/PVO, or UN forces as required. Option three reduces the span of control required of the command. As with the first option, environmental complexity determines the selection of this organizational alternative. Interspersed in support doctrine is the idea/concept of both ASCCs and numbered armies.

As stated above, the numbered army is more a function than a physical force, or standing organization. Doctrine draws a distinction between numbered armies and ASCCs. Along with the ASCC, numbered army commanders are also responsible for establishing linkages with joint, multinational, government, voluntary, and interagency organizations. However, the ASCC focuses on support operations and the numbered army commander focuses on the conduct of operations and the requirements of a joint force land component, if designated by the CINC. These options provide an orderly means for the army to accomplish operational-level responsibilities within a given theater.<sup>69</sup> However a significant flaw exists with this concept as it applies to 8th Army, because 8th Army is now both an ASCC and a *numbered army*.

In summary, FM 100-16 refines the tasks and outlines the options for the ASCC.<sup>70</sup> This portion of doctrine distinguishes between the numbered Army and the ASCC. Eighth Army has the potential to conduct both operations simultaneously. Eighth and 3d Armies are numbered armies in name only. As shown in chapter 1, numbered armies are interim, temporary organizations designed to provide a level of C2 between multiple corps during armed conflicts. Yet 100-16 has altered this definition and now uses it to describe component commands.<sup>71</sup> However only 3d and 8th Armies are numbered armies using this definition. FM 100-7 provides more insight to 8th Army's command structure.

FM 100-7 provides the most recent doctrinal explanation of the ASCC chain of command structure and is roughly consistent with both FM 100-10 and 100-16. The ASCC follows an administrative chain of command that runs from

the NCA down through the Secretary of the Army, Army Chief of Staff, to the Army component forces.<sup>72</sup> Secretaries execute force apportionment duties through combatant commands by exercising administrative control (ADCON) through the ASCC assigned to the specific combatant command. Eighth Army does not fall under a combatant command. Instead, it supports an area CINC or sub-unified commander located on the Korean Peninsula. However, the ADCON concept still applies.

The ASCC, using ADCON authority, is responsible for preparing, maintaining, training, equipping, administering, and supporting army forces (ARFOR) assigned to unified and specified commands. Service, administrative, and support channels provide administrative, training, and logistic support, ensuring that the CINC receives organized, equipped, and trained US military forces.

According to FM 100-7, CINCs are responsible for organizing their theater and command relationships, which is consistent with operational doctrine.<sup>73</sup> The ASCC organizes the ARFOR to best accomplish the assigned missions. Though the CINC has the authority to direct certain Army organizational options, he normally leaves internal Army organization and command relationships to the ASCC.

According to doctrine, the structure and duties of the ASCC vary from support to operational maneuver. Current doctrine allows flexibility for the CINCs to design and configure their ASCCs. The ASCC has evolved from primarily a theater support force to a force with the combined functions of operational



theater support and operational warfighting. The question for 8th Army planners is whether or not an ASCC can provide these additional capabilities under their current structure and TOE. More specifically, can 8th Army function as an ASCC in accordance with doctrinal tasks and missions.

Based on this doctrinal foundation, the ASCC can execute a variety of warfighting and support missions. The Korean AOR has no resident US Army corps stationed on the Peninsula. To conduct warfighting functions, 8th Army would require the capacity to command and control one or more corps or division-size units. Chapter 4 compares 8th Army's warfighting capabilities with those of a generic US Army corps to determine if 8th Army is capable of both warfighting and support missions.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **8th ARMY'S WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES COMPARED WITH THOSE OF THE "TYPICAL" US ARMY CORPS**

*The expansion of our mission, functions, and responsibilities reflects the Army's overarching defense strategy to shape the strategic environment, respond to the full spectrum of threats, and prepare for the dangers of tomorrow.*

Commander, Eighth US Army, Lieutenant General Randolph House, during the ASCC reorganization-retreat ceremony<sup>74</sup>

Based on its doctrinal configuration and the flexibility of the CINC, the 8th Army has developed into a unique organization with a distinct warfighting design. According to its tactical standing operating procedures (TSOP), its key missions include emergency evacuation and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI), which are duties closely associated with its previous

designation as a theater army.<sup>75</sup> Its C2 duties include planning, executing, and processing combat operations as a warfighting headquarters. The challenge for 8th Army is to determine whether or not it has the structure to execute these tasks to standard. One method of measuring 8th Army's capabilities is to compare it to a typical US Army Corps. Corps organizations are not standard. Doctrine addresses corps organizations as "typical," which indicates the most common or likely organization for combat. The corps is the largest tactical unit in the US Army.<sup>76</sup> Higher echelon units, such as 8th and 3d Armies, might maneuver corps in the conduct of combat operations.

Chapter 4 identifies the various tasks and missions of 8th Army and compares these to a corps to determine if 8th Army, as an ASCC, has the staff sections needed to shape the battlefield and maneuver multiple corps. One of the key functions of the corps staff is to shape the battlefield for subordinate maneuver divisions and brigades. Based on its recent redesignation, 8th Army should have a similar capability, except at a higher level.

Chapter 4 also uses the corps staff structure to measure the 8th Army staff's ability to plan and fight wars, and shape the battlefield as an ASCC. This method of analysis presents 8th Army's mission and essential tasks, followed by an 8th Army-to-corps comparison of the four primary staff groups: G1, G4, G2, and G3. This research effort includes only unclassified data; therefore, it will address only those staff areas and missions deemed releasable. Regardless of this restriction, this chapter analyzes 8th Army's ability to perform both support and warfighting functions.<sup>77</sup>

According to its tactical standing operating procedures (TSOP), 8th Army will execute a wide range of capabilities, yet it is deficient in some areas. Eighth Army's mission indicates a variety of functions:

The mission of the Eighth United States Army is to provide forces directed to support UNC/CFC in armistice and in war. As the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) [it will] manage, operate, and secure the theater support base and sustain all [US] Army forces in theater [and] joint and allied forces as directed. On order, [it will] receive, equip, marshal, stage, and move [US] Army augmentation forces forward for commitment by CINC CFC. *Be prepared to conduct independent operations as directed by COMUSKOREA.*<sup>78</sup> [Emphasis added.]

The last sentence in this mission statement states that 8th Army has the potential requirement to conduct operational warfighting missions. This capability is also listed as one of 8th Army's essential tasks. The essential tasks include the following:

- Provide trained and ready combat and combat support forces to CFC as directed to support flexible deterrent options.
- Coordinate and execute transition to war, deploy to wartime positions.
- Defend US installations and activities in the COMMZ.
- Manage and operate the Army support base in theater; sustain and reconstitute deployed [US] Army forces. Equip, marshal, stage, and move [US] selected allied augmentation forces arriving in theater.
- *Conduct independent operations as a numbered army under the control of CFC as required.*<sup>79</sup> [Emphasis added.]

The 8th Army staff must accomplish the following:

- Develop staff estimates; prepare and issue operational and logistic plans and orders for the theater army.
- Plan, coordinate, and supervise the defense of US installations, facilities, and activities in the COMMZ.
- Plan, coordinate, supervise, and monitor the status of US time phased deployment list (TPFDL) units as they progress through the RSOI cycle.

- Manage the Army support base in theater; establish and adjust theater lines of communication; coordinate the projection of support from CONUS.
- Deploy and operate the Eighth Army Operation Center (EACH); command and control the deployment of [8th Army] to wartime positions.
- Identify shortfalls in support infrastructure requirements; request military units to offset shortfalls; coordinate the adjustment of TPFDL and USFK forces.
- *Plan and execute the organizational transition of the staff into a numbered army under OPCON to CFC.*<sup>80</sup> [Emphasis added.]

Each task from these two lists support the overall 8th Army mission.

However, the last entry in each list emphasizes 8th Army's commitment to warfighting missions. The challenge to 8th Army is whether or not it has the necessary staff components to execute these tasks in comparison with the corps, which has organic combat, CS, and CSS forces.

The corps is perhaps the most capable ground combat force in the US Army. According to FM 100-15, the current corps configuration provides perhaps the best organization to fight and plan current and future combat operations.<sup>81</sup> The basic corps organization provides the capability to shape the battlespace. The corps has the assets to function as both a tactical and an operational headquarters. In joint operations, the corps can function as both the joint task force (JTF) Headquarters and as the ARFOR headquarters.<sup>82</sup> This monograph uses the corps as a standard to analyze and measure the effectiveness and warfighting capability of 8th Army in the ASCC role.

The corps is extremely capable of fighting simultaneous operations in the rear, close, and deep areas of the battlefield. Most corps configurations consist of at least two to three maneuver divisions; at least one or more separate infantry

or mechanized brigades; an armored cavalry regiment; and field artillery (FA), aviation (AV), engineer (EN), air defense artillery (ADA), signal, chemical, military intelligence (MI), civil affairs (CA), and military police (MP) brigades. It also consists of finance and personnel groups, a psychological operations (PSYOP) tactical support battalion, and a corps support command (COSCOM). Other supporting elements include special operations forces (SOF) and others (METT-T dependent).<sup>83</sup> A corps can shape the close fight by attacking deep with several assets. When augmented, 8th Army has similar capabilities.

Though there is no standard or "typical" theater, field, or numbered army organization, 8th Army has several assigned and OPCON units capable of planning and executing combat operations. Though these units might be slightly different in TOE from those found in the corps, they provide an echelon-above-corps-level of staff coordination. Eighth Army has an Engineer Command (ENCOM), Air Defense Command (AAMDC), and two aviation units (17th Aviation and the 6th Cavalry Brigade).<sup>84</sup> All battlefield operating systems (BOS) elements are available to 8th Army for planning; however, some of these assets might not be available until open hostilities begin.

According to its TSOP, 8th Army's staff sections are consistent with those of the corps. The G1/Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) controls personnel and administration. The G1's mission statement parallels 8th Army's mission, except that it adds the statement: "Plans, coordinates, and executes deep strike operations in support of the ground component commander (GCC), and conducts other combat operations to support the CFC Campaign plan as

directed.”<sup>85</sup> The G1 is the principal staff officer for all human resources, administrative, and personnel matters. However, the commander, 8th Personnel Command (PERSCOM) serves as both the Theater Adjutant General (AG) and PERSCOM Commander directing command-related military personnel functions. As the Theater PERSCOM Commander, he provides general and technical support for the theater personnel service and support operations, and directs all noncommand-related military activities.<sup>86</sup> In addition, 8th Army has a finance brigade (75th FINCOM) and a medical brigade (18th MEDCOM).<sup>87</sup> These assets indicate that the G1 section is capable of supporting multiple maneuver units.

By comparison, the corps G1 has the support of a personnel and finance group. The personnel group sustains personnel readiness and exercises C2 over subordinate personnel units.<sup>88</sup> Likewise, the finance group coordinates the finance operations of all corps finance battalions. This support includes commercial vendor services and contracting support, military pay, disbursing funding, accounting, travel pay, civilian pay, and all forms of non-US pay, including enemy prisoner of war (EPW) and local hire.<sup>89</sup>

The G4 section of 8th Army appears to have the necessary foundation to support multiple corps-level units. With its recent transition from a theater army designed primarily for support, 8th Army is well suited to handle logistic and personnel contingencies. Matching these capabilities with those of a corps also validates the fact that 8th Army closely resembles the corps and should be capable of supporting operational missions.

Based on the 8th Army TSOP, the G4 is capable of performing the following key tasks: supply, maintenance, transportation, services, and plans. The support structure, through the 19th Theater Support Command (TSC), can provide support to all contingency forces deploying to the Korean AOR. The G4 is responsible for common item support to all US forces in supply classes I, II, III (P), IV, and V (Army Common). The G4 section also ensures that all subordinate CSS organizations are flexible and responsive to tactical doctrine and operational requirements and other logistic tasks.<sup>90</sup>

By contrast, the corps G4 has a complete COSCOM that contains a mix of subordinate support units based on METT-T. The COSCOM consists of a functional control center (FCC); a materiel management center (MMC); the movement management center (MMC); a medical brigade, a transportation group, and corps support groups.<sup>91</sup> These assets and capabilities closely match those of 8th Army's TSC. The G4, like the G1, appears well equipped to support warfighting missions.

From the G1 and G4 analysis, 8th Army seems extremely capable of executing numbered army warfighting tasks. Eighth Army's previous role as a theater army provided sufficient staff experience to execute these tasks along with the capability to expand to support increased operations. The major challenges to 8th Army's role as an ASCC are in the G2 and G3 sections.

The 8th Army G2 staff section lists significant capabilities to support the planning and execution of combat operations. However, these missions require certain assets not organic to 8th Army. To shape the battlefield, the G2 should

have the ability to collect, assess, and analyze data. Though there is an MI brigade in Korea, it is currently assigned to echelons above Army or USAINCOM. In case of war, this brigade is reassigned or OPCON to 8th Army.<sup>92</sup> This transition time might be insufficient to exploit early intelligence collection opportunities.

According to its mission statement, the 8th Army G2 section focuses more on the area support portion of the 8th Army mission than warfighting. Its four primary functions are: provide all-source intelligence for its subordinate units and 8th Army staff sections; perform collection management and dissemination functions; use counterintelligence and multidisciplined intelligence to protect the force; and monitor and report TPFDL intelligence units as they arrive in theater.<sup>93</sup> These functions mention very little in support of deep operations, collection, and other intelligence operations directed against enemy forces. It speaks more to friendly force protection and rear area intelligence, which is not consistent with decisive engagements with enemy forces.

Compared to the US Corps, 8th Army requires a level of military intelligence or a unit trained specifically in intelligence operations to execute battlefield shaping as required of a higher headquarters, or in this case, the numbered army. The corps owns an MI brigade. Its missions provide a significant portion of the corps' warfighting capability. The corps G2 has the TOE support of the MI brigade that analyzes information from multiple sources, including communications intercept, enemy prisoner of war (EPW) interrogation, and imagery capabilities, combined with its information links from theater and



national sensors. With these devices, the corps staff has greater situational awareness. The corps G2 seems better equipped to plan and execute combined arms operations and battlefield shaping than does 8th Army. To control multiple corps, 8th Army would need an assigned MI brigade. Though the plan is to receive this asset in time of war, there might be too little time to plan and execute intelligence operations. Without these assets, it is difficult for 8th Army to function in its role as an operational warfighting ASCC.

The G3 section displays a vast array of warfighting capabilities. According to their TSOP portion, titled the "G3 8th Army Warfighting Organization," this section is prepared to conduct operational warfare. The key divisions of the G3 section are deep operations, current operations, and plans divisions. Each division contains a full complement of BOS representatives, including SOF and combined unconditional warfare task force (CUWTF); command, control, and warfare (C2W), explosive ordinance disposal (EOD), PSYOP, CA, and liaison officers (LO) from the three Korean Armies: the First, Second, and Third ROK, along with the ROK Seventh Corps.

The US corps G3 has approximately the same capabilities. Its staff BOS representatives are more closely associated with the tactical level. However, they provide the corps with sufficient maneuver expertise through its organic combat and CS brigades. Therefore 8th Army, according to its TSOP, proves to be extremely capable of generating plans and orders at the operational level at least as well as the corps.

One can assume that 8th Army will receive sufficient assets should hostilities resume. In the meantime, G3 planners must make every effort to gather and train with all possible augmentees, including reserve forces, active-duty contingency forces, and G2 augmentee/OPCON sections. This requirement justifies the annual sequence of warfighting exercises held each year in Korea.<sup>94</sup>

Research shows that 8th Army lacks direct support from intelligence assets necessary to conduct combat operations in comparison with a corps. The G1/G4 area is extremely capable based on its previous role as a theater army. The G3 seems to have all of the necessary staff sections that resemble a corps'. However, planners rely heavily on intelligence collection, which the G2 manages. Without an MI brigade, or equivalent asset, timely execution is difficult. While it is arguable that there are sufficient intelligence collection and analysis assets currently in Korea, these assets are assigned to higher echelons and support 8th Army only during open hostilities. In terms of planning and collection, 8th Army needs a more responsive command relationship with its intelligence assets in order to fight like a corps. This addition will increase 8th Army's ability to plan and fight immediately, using multiple corps, as an ASCC.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **8th ARMY COMPARED WITH 3d ARMY AND US ARMY EUROPE**

*The ASCC supports the theater combatant CINC by conducting Army operations to support or attain the CINC's established objectives.*<sup>95</sup>

Another method of analyzing 8th Army's warfighting structure is by comparing 8th Army with other theater army or ASCC units. Each ASCC has a unique mission based upon the factors of METT-T or as directed by the area CINC; therefore it is difficult to compare these units. Further, 8th Army is the only theater army to adopt the ASCC concept as its sole function.<sup>96</sup> Third Army acknowledges its role as an ASCC; however, it assumes multiple missions and C2 configurations based on its geographical AOR. USAREUR continues to perform theater army missions with few references to warfighting and C2. Since doctrine says that all theater armies are now ASCCs, Chapter 5 refers to these three organizations as ASCCs. Both 8th Army and USAREUR are forward-deployed, while 3d Army must deploy to its AOR. These differences represent the unique tasks and missions of these ASCCs.

US Army Europe provides an interesting comparison and helps to understand 8th Army's unique role in Korea. The European theater of operations (ETO), unlike Korea, has both a dedicated geographical combatant commander along with a robust US military presence. The Fifth US Army Corps (V Corps) is forward-deployed to Europe with two US heavy divisions. Fifth Corps Headquarters has the necessary staff to conduct operational and tactical missions, along with various allied European brigades. For this reason, USAREUR plays a significantly limited role in warfighting compared to 8th Army. There is currently no forward-deployed US corps headquarters in Korea. This is one major reason for 8th Army's transition to a "warfighting" ASCC. According to

8th Army, this transition will present the CINC a set of relevant and complementary capabilities.<sup>97</sup>

If both USAREUR and V Corps had the same warfighting capabilities, this would likely prove redundant and unnecessary especially due to the current threat in Europe. USAREUR's mission is to do the following:

USAREUR maintains a forward-deployed force, trained and ready, prepared for protection in order to conduct & support the full, immediate combat power spectrum of joint & multinational operations, conducts engagement activities, protects US forces & resources, conducts sustainment base operations & ensures the readiness & well being of its personnel, in the theater, or elsewhere....<sup>98</sup>

USAREUR's mission essential tasks include the following:

- Provide and sustain trained and ready forces.
- Protect the force.
- Promote regional stability.
- Gain and maintain information dominance.
- Conduct theater power projection operations deployment and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI).
- Operate a strategic sustainment base.
- Provide for the wellbeing of soldiers, civilians, and family members.

Both the mission statement and the mission essential task list (METL) describe a theater support mission. These tasks closely resemble those of 8th Army except they suggest no warfighting tasks. In the European AOR, USAREUR provides support while V Corps executes warfighting tasks.

To compensate for a lack of an "immediate response" warfighting headquarters, the USFK CINC uses the 8th Army in the ASCC role. Assuming that war plans include deploying one or more corps to Korea, there would be a significant time delay before a CONUS-based corps could deploy and initiate combat operations. Therefore, 8th Army's role as an "intermediate," if not a

permanent warfighting ASCC is justified and necessary in the Korean AOR. In an article written about 8th Army's ASCC transition, Sergeant David E. Gillespie states that 8th Army's transition would provide the CINC with the capability of immediate response.<sup>99</sup> It further states that current conditions demand that forward-deployed forces remain ready to respond at a moment's notice. Should conditions demand the deployment or employment of US Army forces, the CINC might consider using the 8th Army.<sup>100</sup>

Third Army provides another unique example of a theater army comparable to 8th Army. Also known as the US Army Forces Central Command, (ARCENT), 3d Army has a vast history in a variety of significant missions that include Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and several recent "no-notice" deployments to Kuwait. Headquartered at Fort McPherson, Georgia, 3d Army is the only worldwide deployable service component command.<sup>101</sup> Its mission is similar to the original theater army concept.

[ARCENT] serves as the Army component headquarters for [US] Central Command (USCENTCOM)...Functions as a Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC) or Coalition Joint Task Force (C/JTF) when designated by Commander-in-Chief, [US] Central Command (USCINCCENT)...Executes Operational Control (OPCON) and Tactical Control (TACON) of forces operating within the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility.<sup>102</sup>

Third Army's geographical AOR is one of the most volatile regions in the world. It consist of the Middle East, Southwest and Central Asia and the Horn of Africa. Within these areas, there are twenty-five countries. Since the Gulf War (1990-91), 3d Army has deployed combat forces to Southwest Asia on eight separate occasions in order to deter, assure, and defend against aggression.<sup>103</sup>

In his command vision, the 3d Army commander states that 3d Army is “A versatile, ready, and relevant command and control headquarters.”<sup>104</sup> He further states that 3d Army will “serve as an army service component command, numbered field army, joint force land component command, or joint task force that is capable of conducting joint, combined, and coalition operations to achieve decisive victory.”<sup>105</sup> Whether or not 3d Army can perform these tremendous tasks is beyond the scope of this research question. However, it is clear that the commander interprets his mission to extend beyond the limits of theater support. In this case, 3d and 8th Army goals are similar; however, a significant amount of 3d Army’s staff sections and capabilities derive from Reserve Component (RC) forces, which means that there are inherent administrative and training challenges. Therefore, 3d Army must mobilize and deploy to its AOR while 8th Army is already forward-deployed primarily with active-duty personnel.

## **CONCLUSION**

The Army continues to think, learn, respond, and adapt based on domestic and international policies. Assuming that this is true, the Army’s theater army or ASCC doctrine will continue to change in order to provide the most efficient command, control, and logistic support arrangements at EAC level. Based on its unique history, its location on the Korean Peninsula, the Armistice Agreement, and doctrinal freedom, 8th Army has evolved into a multidimensional force with extraordinary capabilities. Eighth Army’s recent conversion to an ASCC marks a significant transition point from being primarily support with a

minor role in warfighting to just the opposite. The introduction of the theater support command further removes logistic missions from 8th Army's duties. Therefore, 8th Army has little choice but to adapt more of a warfighting posture than a support posture. This monograph attempts to quantify the factors that will determine if 8th Army can fulfill this new role.

Whether or not 8th Army is capable of performing its role as a warfighting ASCC, research proves, to some degree, that 8th Army might have one major deficiency that could impact decisive combat operations. The lack of dedicated intelligence assets might cause turbulence and delayed reactions to key opportunities on the battlefield. Other staff agencies seem to possess the necessary sections and capabilities to fight at the EAC level.

Measured against a typical US Army corps, 8th Army has sufficient staff assets to execute operational-level warfare. Research shows that 8th Army has robust G1 and G4 sections. Eighth Army's previous role as a theater army provided significant experience, assets, and resources to execute these functions. The G3 section also shows a solid foundation with staff elements representing each BOS along with a variety of additional capabilities that include SOF, CA, and others. Eighth Army headquarters also has a significant major subordinate command to provide both planning advice and execution of deep or shaping operations. Unlike the corps, 8th Army does not have an artillery brigade or an MI brigade at its immediate disposal. However, there are significant corps-level artillery units available in country, and several MI units assigned to echelons above Army, which support 8th Army in wartime. Based

on unclassified information, 8th Army's assets resemble those of the corps enough to plan and prosecute a war effort.

Whether or not 8th Army needs a warfighting capability involves METT-T criteria. Based on Korea's unique history, geographical location, mission requirements, and forces available, the CINC has determined a need for an EAC warfighting headquarters. As compared to EUCOM, USAREUR has a corps with two divisions in its AOR. Korea does not have a corps headquarters immediately available. Compared to CENTCOM, 3d Army must deploy along with corps and divisions to its AOR. Therefore 3d Army would likely arrive with sufficient corps-level combat power and C2 that might not require it to act as the primary warfighter. In Korea, even if one or more corps deployed in time of war, RSOI would not happen until long after hostilities began. For these reasons, 8th Army will serve best as a warfighting ASCC, at least until follow-on forces arrive.



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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Larry H. Addington, *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century*, 2e (Bloomington, Indiana: University Press, 1994), 271.

<sup>2</sup> Roy K. Flint, "Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950," in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, *America's First Battles, 1776-1965* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press, 1986), 267. This entire paragraph is summarized to show the chain of events that brought 8th Army to Korea.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), A-1, 2-26. Hereafter known as FM 100-7.

<sup>5</sup> The author uses the adjective "warfighting" and in some cases, "fighting" to make the distinction between the various forms of theater armies/ASCCs. Based on research, theater armies fought at the operational level of war until after the Vietnam War. After Vietnam, this role shifted to one of support and training within the theater. However, the geographical CINC has the power and authority to design the ASCC to meet his goals and intent for the theater. Therefore, some ASCCs or theater armies have only support duties while others have a mixture of both. To clarify this point, the author uses "warfighting" to distinguish between the various types of ASCC. For example, US Army Japan has no operational tasks- only support of US Pacific Command. In contrast, 8th Army continues to increase its "warfighting" duties and tasks, which generates one of the key questions in this monograph: does 8th Army have the capacity to fight wars? Older manuals use the term "operational" to distinguish warfighting duties from support duties and logistic tasks. Whereas the term "support" is clearly understood, the term "operational" has gained a variety of significant meanings and is no longer a distinctive term. For example, today's doctrine includes "operational art," "operational level of war," "operational logistics," "breach operations," and others. "Warfighting" is perhaps the best term to

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distinguish between military operations that directly engage enemy forces and those operations that support the theater.

<sup>6</sup> The author refers to USAREUR as a theater army/ASCC because USAREUR has not officially transitioned to an ASCC, nor has it officially adopted ASCC doctrine. Likewise, 3<sup>rd</sup> Army's mission requires the unit to assume multiple command and control (C2) configurations once deployed; they include Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC), Joint Forces Command (JFC), along with ASCC missions. Based upon 3<sup>rd</sup> Army's mission statement, the commander considers the ASCC one of many functions, but not a primary function.

<sup>7</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 6. Hereafter known as FM 100-5 (1941).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-15, *Field Service Regulations for Larger Units* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950), 15. Hereafter known as FM 100-15 (1950).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>11</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949), 6.

<sup>12</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-15 Test, *Larger Unit Operations Test* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), 3-1. Hereafter known as FM 100-15 Test (1974).

<sup>13</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-15, *Field Service Regulations for Larger Units* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963), 10. Hereafter known as FM 100-15 (1963).

<sup>14</sup> FM 100-15 Test (1974), 3-1.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), 186-187. Hereafter known as FM 100-5 (1986).

<sup>18</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 4-4 through 4-5. Hereafter known as FM 100-5 (1993).

<sup>19</sup> Daniel J. Petrosky, *Eighth US Army Standards Handbook* (Headquarters, Eighth US Army Korea, 1999), History-1.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., History-2.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> James A. Huston, *Guns, Butter, Powder and Rice* (Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1989), 157.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 61. This reference shows how 8th Army provided both C2 and logistic support during the Korean War.

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- <sup>27</sup> Eighth US Army Korea (EUSAK), "Logistical Problems and Their Solutions," (Headquarters, Eighth US Army Korea, 1952), 23.
- <sup>28</sup> Petrosky, 42.
- <sup>29</sup> Harry G. Summers Jr., *Korean War Almanac* (New York: Facts on File, 1990), 274. According to Summers, one reason for early Chinese success was because the Chinese were able to split or find and exploit, gaps between 8th Army forces and the independent X Corps. Later, X Corps joined 8th Army.
- <sup>30</sup> Petrosky, History-3.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>33</sup> Huston, 62-65.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid., History-4.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid., History-5.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid., History-6.
- <sup>38</sup> David E. Gillespie, "Eight Army Reorganized as a Component Command," *Army Link News*, found at <http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/mar1998/a19980318army.html>, February 10, 2000, 2.
- <sup>39</sup> All theater armies or theater support forces are not ASCCs. Though FM 100-16 states that ASCCs were formerly theater armies, some theater armies have not officially changed their designation. For example, US Army Europe/7th Army Training Command has not been redesignated.
- <sup>40</sup> FM 100-15 Test (1974), 3-10. This manual states that "In unusual wartime situations the theater army commander might be given operational responsibility for all army forces." The author's opinion is that doctrine writers were reluctant to totally exclude theater armies from warfighting tasks. Therefore, theater armies have always had a role in actual warfighting.
- <sup>41</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-5 (Change 1), *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 1-1.
- <sup>42</sup> Ibid., 12-11 to 12-12. This reference suggests that the theater army was primarily a support agency allowing corps the necessary support to fight at the tactical level.
- <sup>43</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 186. Here after known as FM 100-5 (1982).
- <sup>44</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-10, *Combat Service Support* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 3-16.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid., 3-16 to 3-17. The idea of the corps as an ASCC is also found in earlier versions of FM 100-5. As stated in the monograph, 100-5 no longer advocates a corps as an ASCC; however, some of the earlier support manuals suggest this concept.
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid., 3-16 to 3-17.
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid., 3-17.
- <sup>50</sup> FM 100-5 (1982), 15-3.

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 15-3-15-4.

<sup>52</sup> FM 100-5 (1986), 186-187.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. This is a summary which shows that earlier manuals recognized the dual role of the theater army. Research discovered that operational manuals emphasized the operational roles of the theater army more than its logistic duties within the theater.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-10, *Combat Service Support* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), 3-6.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 3-6 through 3-7.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 3-7.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-16, *Operational Support* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), 2-10.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. This note shows a major transition in support structure. No manual completely explains in detail the effects of this transition. Since numbered armies were also theater armies, it seems that numbered armies should now become ASCCs. However doctrine does not conclude this point.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 2-10 to 2-11.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 2-13. Regardless of the doctrine, area CINCs and other priorities will determine command relations.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 2-10 through 2-13.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> FM 100-7, 2-6.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Gillespie, 2.

<sup>75</sup> Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, *Tactical Standing Operating Procedures (TACSOP) Draft 01* (US/ROK: Government Agencies, 1997), ii. Hereafter known as Eighth Army TACSOP.

<sup>76</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-15, *Corps Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989), 1-1. Hereafter known as FM 100-15 (1989).

<sup>77</sup> This analytical method compares releasable information about 8th Army's TOE and structure with that of a US corps. Some information comes from the 8th Army G3 plans division.

<sup>78</sup> Eighth Army TACSOP, ii. This document is rated UNCLASSIFIED. Though this TACSOP is dated October 1997, and the ASCC conversion was officially 1998, the 8th Army mission statement indicates that the unit had begun to change to an ASCC. Therefore, this TACSOP addresses 8th Army as an ASCC

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even though it was published approximately six months prior to the official conversion.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., ii-iii.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., iii.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> FM 100-15 (1989), 1-3 through 1-4.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 1-1.

<sup>84</sup> This information was received via electronic mail from Major William King who is currently assigned to the G3 Plans Division of 8th US Army, Korea. He also states there were more units that would arrive during wartime. This information exceeds the security classification of this monograph. Hereafter known as King.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., A-1.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., A-1 to A-3.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>88</sup> FM 100-15 (1989), 1-11.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 1-11.

<sup>90</sup> Eighth Army TACSOP, D1-1. This is the G4 section of the TACSOP.

<sup>91</sup> FM 100-15 (1989), 1-10 through 1-11.

<sup>92</sup> King, 1.

<sup>93</sup> TACSOP, B-1. This reference lists the 8th Army G2 staff functions.

<sup>94</sup> Due to the sensitive nature of these yearly exercises and the forces involved, this monograph will not discuss these exercises in detail.

<sup>95</sup> FM 100-7, 2-22.

<sup>96</sup> Based on the author's research, neither USAREUR nor ARCENT have officially adopted the ASCC title.

<sup>97</sup> Gillespie, 1.

<sup>98</sup> US Army Europe Website, *Mission Statement and Mission Essential Task List (METL)*, US Army Public Affairs, found at <http://www.hqusareur.army.mil/missionstatement1.htm>, 23 February 2000, 1.

<sup>99</sup> Gillespie, 2.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>101</sup> Third United States Army, *Welcome*, found at <http://www.arcent.army.mil/pages/welcome.htm> (updated 25 January 2000), 21 March 2000, 1. Hereafter known as 3<sup>rd</sup> Army, *Welcome*.

<sup>102</sup> Third United States Army, *Mission*, found at <http://www.arcent.army.mil/pages/mission.htm> (updated 27 August 1999), 21 March 2000, 1.

<sup>103</sup> 3<sup>rd</sup> Army, *Welcome*, 2.

<sup>104</sup> Third United States Army, *Vision*, found at <http://www.arcent.army.mil/pages/vision.htm> (updated 27 August 1999), 21 March 2000, 1.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 1.

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